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Privity, Preclusion, and the Parent-Child
Relationship
Preclusion, a modern term encompassing the procedural
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, is a judicial
mechanism that serves to prevent relitigation of a claim or issue
once a final determination has been made in a court of competent
jurisdiction.' Through the use of preclusion, courts may secure
finality and consistency in judgments and eliminate harassing
multiple litigation and spurious claim^.^ Courts may invoke preclusion to prevent relitigation not only by parties to the first
action, but by nonparties as well;3courts have justified preclusion
of nonparties in future litigation by reason of their privity relationship with parties to the first a ~ t i o n . ~
The doctrine of privity provides that a nonparty whose interests are substantially identical to those of a party who has had
his day in court is not deprived of justice by the denial of an
opportunity to relitigate the same matters. While privity is ostensibly based on any commonality of interests, common law courts
have traditionally viewed the doctrine as applying to a fixed set
1. The term "preclusion" is used throughout this Comment to indicate the concepts
traditionally referred to as res judicata and collateral estoppel. The preclusion rubric is
gaining wide acceptance among courts, commentators, and casebook authors as a more
accurate and functional terminology. See, e.g., Towle v. Boeing Airplane Co., 364 F.2d
590,592 (8th Cir. 1966); Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35,65 (D. Minn. 1966);
Moore v. Deal, 240 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (E.D. Pa. 1965);Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal.
R. MEISENHOLDER,
G. STEVENS,
3d 942,544 P.2d 941,126 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1976); D. KARLEN,
& A. VESTAL,
CIVILPROCEDURE
(1975); J. MCCOID,CIVILPROCEDURE
(1974); Vestal, Extent
L. REV.1 (1968). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments
of Claim Preclusion, 54 IOWA
recognizes the modem preclusion terminology, but continues to use a mixture of old and
OF JUDGMENTS
vii & §§ 68,88(Tent. Draft No. 2,
new in its text. RJBTATEMENT(SECOND)
19%).
Res judicata and collateral estoppel are essentially equivalent to claim preclusion and
issue preclusion respectively. See notes 11-26 and accompanying text infra. The preclusion
terminology facilitates a unified approach to the doctrine and obviates many artificial
distinctions between res judicata and collateral estoppel that result from their disparate
origins. See generally Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res
Judicata, 35 ILL. L. REV.41, 53-54 (1940).
2. See Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. LOUISU.L.J.29, 29-35 (1964).
3. General application of preclusion to nonparties is summarized in RESTATEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS
9$ 81-88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975). See generally Vestal, supra
(SECOND)
L. REV.27,
note 1, at 12-18; Vestal, PreclusionlRes Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 IOWA
43-76 (1964).
4. E.g., Falk v. Falk Corp., 390 F. Supp. 1276, 1283-84 (E.D. Wis. 1975), Gamble Co.
v. Buyers Transp. Co., 355 F. Supp. 547, 557 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
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of relationship^.^ Familial relationships are conspicuously absent
from the traditional privity lists. Consequently, rather than determining whether the merits of each case and the underlying
policy factors warrant imposition of preclusion, most courts have
summarily refused to invoke preclusion, holding that parents and
children are not in p r i ~ i t y . ~
Cases involving the parent-child relationship do not mandate such a rhadamanthine application of traditional privity
rules. Rather, the unique nature of this relationship requires a
rational judicial approach to the use of preclusion. This Comment
will consider the policies underlying privity and preclusion and
apply those policies to selected cases in which the courts have
improperly invoked, or failed to invoke, preclusion. It will also
evaluate possible solutions to the conflict between preclusion and
substantive rights by examining those procedures and judicial
controls by which the policies favoring preclusion may be fulfilled
in parent-child cases without jeopardizing the rights of the persons involved.

A. Preclusion in General
The concept of continuity is fundamental to the AngloAmerican legal system. The law is a continuum; interdependence
of decisions forms the basis for a just application of its principles.'
One aspect of this continuum is the doctrine of stare d e c i ~ i s ; ~
another is law of the case? Preclusion is merely one additional
facet of this overall interdependence. In applying preclusion, a
court in essence invokes a more specific form of stare decisis-the
principle by which former adjudication may influence subsequent
cases. Preclusion requires stricter adherence to previously litigated claims or issues and may demand the same result reached
in former cases. This demand may serve to preclude subsequent
5. See RESTATEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS
§ 83 & Comment a (1942); Vestal, supra note 1,
at 12-14. Exhaustive works on the preclusive effects of judgments invariably include lists
of designated privy relationships. E.g., 1A. FREEMAN,
LAW OF JUDGMENTS
§ § 438, 444-501
LAW OF JUDGMENTS
$9 549-598 (1891).
(5th ed. 1925); 2 H. BLACK,
6 . See Greenlee v. John G. Shedd Aquarium, 36 Ill. App. 3d 924, 344 N.E.2d 788
(1976); Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969).
7. The principles of preclusion and their rationale are discussed in terms of the
3-7 (1969).
general continuum concept in A. VESTAL,RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION
BASICCIVIL
PROCEDURE
211 (1972); 2 H. BLACK,supra note 5, a t
8. See M. GREEN,
8 603.
9. Vestal, Law of the Case: Single Suit Preclusion, 1967 UTAHL. REV. 1.
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litigation altogether.
The preclusion principles are not self-justifying. They exist
only because they serve to protect interests that our society and
legal system have recognized as indispensable to fundamental
fairness and to efficient adjudication of disputes. Four distinct
policies provide the foundation for all forms of preclusion: (1) to
provide security to litigants by assuring finality, (2) to ensure
consistency in judgments, (3) to avoid harassing multiple litigation, and (4) to reduce the burden on the courts by elimination
of spurious claims.1° Where the imposition of preclusion serves
none of these policies, it is neither justified nor desirable. Conversely, if denying the right to relitigate a claim or issue would
serve one or more of the above policies, the courts should carefully
weigh the factors favoring preclusion, rather than mechanically
refuse to apply it by reason of traditional privity rules.ll These
policies apply equally to both categories into which preclusion
may be subdivided-claim preclusion and issue preclusion.12
1. Claim preclusion

Claim preclusion operates to prevent a party or privy to an
initial action from relitigating in a second suit a claim on which
a final judgment has been reached. Although many legal scholars
have further subdivided this principle,13 one rule suffices to cover
all cases: "One may not sue twice on the same cause of action
where the first suit terminated in a final judgment on the merits."14 This simple definition includes all the requirements that
must be satisfied to invoke claim preclusion: (1) same cause of
action, (2) decision on the merits, and (3) finality of judgment.
The first requirement, that the causes of action in the two
suits be identical, has proved troublesome. Courts and commentators have failed to develop a sufficiently precise definition of
"cause of action" that is workable in a majority of cases.15 Two
10. The rationale of the policies favoring preclusive effect of claims and issues is
discussed in A. VESTAL,supra note 7, a t 8-12. Professor Vestal refers to a policy of
"establishing the rights of individuals." Providing security to litigants by assuring finality
and consistent judgments is a policy implicit in this category. See id. at 8.
11. Compare Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 544 P.2d 941, 126 Cal. Rptr.
805 (1976) with Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969).
12. For an introduction to the concepts of claim and issue preclusion, see A. VESTAL,
supra note 7 , at 43-59, 189-206 (1969).
13. Commentators have traditionally split the concept of claim preclusion into "bar"
and "merger" and treated the two separately. See M. GREEN,supra note 8, at 201-02
CIVILPROCEDURE
$ 11.9, at 550 (1965).
(1972); J. FLEMING,
14. J. MCCOID,supra note 1, at 622.
15. For a discussion of the basic problems surrounding the definition of "claim" or
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theories concerning what constitutes a single claim or cause of
action have evolved. The primary right theory narrowly defines
a cause of action or claim as the infringement of a single right by
a single wrong? The more practical theory, from the standpoint
of judicial economy, is the factual test that requires a plaintiff to
litigate in one action all issues arising from a single transaction
or series of transactions. l7
The second criterion for claim preclusion requires that the
initial judgment be rendered on the merits; i.e., the judgment
must be based on those factual conclusions which support the
claim and not on unrelated matters. Thus, any judgment obtained by fraud or collusion is not an adjudication on the merits
and therefore not a proper circumstance for the imposition of
p r e c l u ~ i o nWhether
.~~
or not a judgment is considered to be on the
merits for preclusion purposes may depend at times on procedural rules such as those pertaining to multiple dismissal^.^^
The third criterion requires that the first judgment be "final"
before preclusion can be invoked in a second suit. Finality generally connotes exhaustion of remedies with the particular judicial
body pronouncing judgment. Finality does not necessarily indicate, however, that the original litigant's rights have been conclu"cause of action" and their potential resolution, see Schopflocher, What is a Single Cause
of Action for the Purpose of the Doctrine of Res Judicata?, 21 ORE.L. REV.319,363 (1942).
For more recent discussions, noting that problems of vagueness continue to plague the
phrase "cause of action," see M. GREEN,supra note 8, a t 202-03; J. FLEMING,
supra note
13, 8 11.10, a t 552-57.
16. The United States Supreme Court approved the primary right theory in Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927):
A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of
a right which the facts show. The number and variety of the facts alleged do
not establish more than one cause of action so long as their result, whether they
be considered severally or in combination, is the violation of but one right by a
single legal wrong.
A more recent decision adhering to this concept of cause of action is Smith v. Kirckpatrick, 305 N.Y. 66, 70, 11 N.E.2d 209, 212 (1953). While still an accepted theory, the
application of the primary right formulation often results in excess fragmentation that
may serve to cloud rather than clarify a party's ultimate rights.
17. E.g., Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 469-70 (3d Cir.
1950); Falcone v. Middlesex Co. Medical Soc'y, 47 N.J. 92, 219 A.2d 505 (1966); cf. Ashe
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448, 453-55 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) (Harlan argues for
a "same transaction" test in applying preclusion in criminal or quasi-criminal cases. This
is basically the test now advocated in the Restatement, referred to as the "transactional
view." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS
8 61 & Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1973).)
18. E.g., Town of Andes v. Ely, 158 U.S. 312 (1895); Grummons v. Zollinger, 240 F.
Supp. 63, 75 (N.D. Ind. 1964), aff'd, 341 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1965).
19. See generally FED.R. CIV.P. 41; Vestal, Claim Preclusion by Rule, 2 IND.LEGAL
F. 25 (1968).
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sively determined. State courts are split on the issue of finality
where an appeal is pending.20A majority of jurisdictions, including the federal courts, consider judgments to be final pending
appeal. The United States Supreme Court has twice ruled that
cases are final pending appeal and allowed preclusion despite
subsequent reversal .21
2. Issue preclusion

Issue preclusion is more pervasive in its effect than claim
preclusion and may operate on entirely different causes of action.
Issue preclusion may be invoked where the issues are (1)identical
in both cases, (2) ultimate-i.e., necessary to the ultimate disposition of both cases-and (3) actually litigated in the first case.22
The requirement of identity of issues presents a problem similar to that of "same cause of action."23Theoretically, identity of
issues should be determined by comparing underlying factual
conclusions. In the interest of judicial economy, however, the
modern trend is to allow considerable latitude in the compariIn fact, the breadth that courts attach to the concept of an
issue may be a function of a crowded docket.25In other words, a
judge may be more willing to find identity of issues and impose
preclusion if the relitigation of the same or closely related facts
would unduly burden an overcrowded schedule.
Issue preclusion may be invoked only if the issue under consideration is an "ultimate" one. An ultimate issue is one that is
necessary to the disposition of the cause of action. Logically, one
20. See Makariw v. Rinard, 222 F. Supp. 336,338 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (applying Pennsylvania law): "[Tlhe rule of res judicata is that when a Court of competent jurisdiction
has determined a litigated cause on its merits, the judgment entered, until reversed, is,
forever and under all circumstances, final and conclusive. . . ." This principle is further
clarified in a footnote to the opinion: "The fact that an appeal is pending in the prior civil
action does not militate against its effect as a final judgment." Id. a t 338 n.1. But see
Mutual Orange Distrib. v. Agricultural Prorate Comm'n, 30 F. Supp. 937, 942 (S.D. Cal.
1940) (applying California law). The court applied a California statute (CAL.CN. PROC.
CODE4 1049 (West 1959)) that it construed to deny preclusive effect of a judgment to
which an appeal was pending. See also MONT.REV.CODEANN. § 53-8706 (1947).
21. Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191 (1932); Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499
(1903). The Restatement (Second) follows this view. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS
4 41 & Comments b & f (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
22. See Vestal, PreclusionlRes Judicata Variables: Nature of the Controversy, 1965
WASH.
U.L.Q. 158, 159-87.
23. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text supra.
24. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS
4 68, Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1973) (suggesting that a finding of negligence due to excessive speed may be equated for
preclusion purposes with a finding of negligence for failure to keep a proper lookout).
25. See Vestal, supra note 22, a t 162.
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may not be bound by the determination of an issue if that issue
was not relevant to the final judgment reached by the court. A
notable opinion authored by Judge Learned Hand established the
principle that ultimate issues decided in an initial suit cannot
preclude redetermination of the same issues in a second suit if
those issues are only mediate therein.26Other decisions have held
that determination of facts or issues mediate in an initial action
cannot preclude their redetermination as ultimate facts in a second suit.27The reasoning behind both principles is to prevent
unintentional preclusion of an issue, the importance of which was
not forseeable in the original action.28
According to the Restatement of Judgments, an "actually
litigated" issue is one put in issue by the pleadings, submitted to
the trier of fact for a determination, and actually ruled on by the
trier of fact.29Thus, it would seem that to satisfy the third criterion for issue preclusion a litigant must have entered evidence on
the issue and received a judicial determination based upon that
evidence." Some courts, however, have held that issues are fully
litigated once a final determination is reached whether the decision is deemed to be on the merits or is merely the result of a
procedural d e t e r m i n a t i ~ nAs
. ~ ~a general rule, the requirement of
actual litigation for purposes of issue preclusion necessitates a
true decision on the merits.

B. Preclusion of Nonparties
Anyone not a party to the original action may be precluded
from litigating the same matters if he is found to be in privity
with the original litigant. Preclusion of nonparties, however, is
not limited to the traditional privity rules. Under differing circumstances two other preclusive devices may be relevant to the
parent-child relationship-derivative rights and adequate repre~ e n t a t i o nAfter
. ~ ~ an examination of each concept, the application
26. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944)." 'Ultimate' facts are those
which the law makes the occasion for imposing its sanctions." Id. a t 928. See Moore v.
United States, 246 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Miss. 1965): "Evidentiary facts or mediate data . . .
are those from which ultimate facts may be inferred." Id. at 21.
OF JUDGMENTS
§ 68, Comment p (1942).
27. See RESTATEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS
§ 68, Comment i (Tent. Draft No. 1,
28. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
1973); Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HAW.L. REV.818, 842-43 (1952).
OF JUDGMENTS
9 68(2) & Comments c & d (1942).
29. RESTATEMENT
30. See, e.g., Eastern Foundation Co. v. Creswell, 475 F.2d 351, 355 (1973).
31. See, e.g., Stuhl v. Tauro, 476 F.2d 233, 233 (1973).
32. Vestal, supra note 1, a t 12-17. Professor Vestal concludes that the applicability
of any of the principles by which a nonparty might be precluded is dependent more on
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of these three preclusive tools to the parent-child relationship will
be discussed.
1.

Traditional privity

Privity, in its most general sense, has been defined as
"[dlerivative interest founded on, or growing out of, contract,
connection, or bond of union between parties."33 Commonality of
interest, then, is the core of the privity concept.34As a matter of
policy, a nonparty should be bound by a judgment if his interests
and those of an original litigant are sufficiently identical to ensure
that no dilution of rights occurs.35
Instead of attempting to define privity in terms of this underlying policy based on common interests, however, courts have
almost universally resorted to a process of definition by classification. Certain relationships have been held to be privy relationships to the exclusion of all others. Most jurisdictions are currently unwilling to find privity in any relationships other than
those traditionally recognized." Most of the recognized relationthe court's concern for and view of the rights involved in relation to the litigation sought
to be repeated than on a rigid application of what may be a technically appropriate rule.
Id. at 17.
33. BLACK'S
LAWDICTIONARY
1361 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
34. Commonality of interest was traditionally considered to include a requirement of
mutuality in the application of preclusion. Neither party nor privy could invoke preclusion
against another unless that person was able to invoke it against them. Iselin v. C.W.
Hunter Co., 173 F.2d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1949); Ericson v. Slomer, 94 F.2d 437, 440 (7th
Cir. 1938); 1A. FREEMAN,
supra note 5, a t # 428; RESTATEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS
8 8 93,96, &
Comment a (1942).
A trend toward rational extension of the preclusion principles to nonparties is seen
in the demise of the mutuality doctrine. The foundation for the abandonment of mutuality
was laid in Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122
P.2d 892 (1942). A limited application of the Bernhard doctrine has been recognized by
the United States Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971). This is the position adopted by the Restatement (Second).
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS,
Reporter's memorandum a t xi (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1975).
35. See, e.g., United States v. California Bridge & Constr. Co., 245 U.S. 337, 341
8 83,
(1917); Litchfield v. Goodnow, 123 U.S. 549, 551 (1887); RESTATEMENTOF JUDGMENTS
Comment a (1942).
36. For a general discussion of privity relationships, see 1A. FREEMAN,
supra note 5,
a t $ # 444-501. The following relationships have generally been accorded privy status:
ancestor-heir: Neagle v. Johnson, 261 F. Supp. 634, 637 (E.D. Mo. 1966); assignorassignee: United States v. New York Terminal Warehouse Co., 233 F.2d 238,241 (5th Cir.
1956); attorney-client: Dow Chem. Co. v. Benton, 163 Tex. 477, 357 S.W.2d 565 (1962);
bailor-bailee: Union Ins. Soc'y v. William Gluckin & Co., 353 F.2d 946,953 (2d Cir. 1965);
lessor-lessee: Kruger & Birch, Inc. v. DuBoyce, 241 F.2d 849, 854 (3d Cir. 1957);
mortgagor-mortgagee: Lingott v. Bihlmire, 24 Wis. 2d 182,189-89a, 128 N.W.2d 625,62829 (1969); shareholder-corporation: Jordan v. Stuart Creamery, Inc., 258 Iowa 1, 9, 137
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ships, such as bailor-bailee, lessor-lessee, and assignor-assignee,
appear to be based on commonality of financial or property intere s t ~ ; parent-child
~'
or other familial relationships are conspicuously absent .38 The understood meaning of this exclusion has
been that "[klinship, whether by affinity or consanguinity, does
not create privity, except where it results in the descent of an
estate one to the other."39
2. Derivativerights

A nonparty may also be precluded if he is attempting to
relitigate a right arguably derived from a party in the first action.
Although the concept is generally associated with tort law," many
of the tort cases are relevant to this discussion since they deal
with familial relationships. The most common derivative action
is the suit for loss of services or consortium by the spouse of an
injured party." Since the right to maintain this action is directly
dependent on the rights of the injured spouse, it is called a derivative claim. Once the spouse holding the primary right has litigated the issue of liability for the injury, a court may preclude
relitigation of the same issues in an action by the other spouse for
loss of services and con~ortiurn.~~
A similar situation may occur
N.W.2d 259, 263 (1965);trustee-bankrupt: Coleman v. Alcock, 272 F.2d 618,622 (5th Cir.
1959); ward-guardian: New Mexico Veteran's Serv. Comm'r v. United States Van Lines,
Inc., 325 F.2d 548, 550 (10th Cir. 1963).
37. In delineating the scope of privity, the Restatement of Judgments uses the following language:
The rule applies to any form of transfer whether by purchase, gift or operation of law. Thus, it applies to heirs, devisees and others taking by conveyance
and to receivers, trustees in bankruptcy, purchasers at judicial sale and others
taking by action of law in judicial process. The rule applied to a transfer of legal
title or of equitable title or the creation of a lien whether by consent of the
transferor or by judicial process.
RESTATEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS
4 89, Comment c (1942).
38. Several courts have held specifically that husband and wife are not in privity.
E.g., Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956); Palmer v. Clarksdale Hosp.,
213 Miss. 611, 57 So. 2d 476 (1952). But see Fleming v. Cooper, 275 Ark. 634, 284 S.W.2d
857 (1955). Community property states have held that husband and wife are in privity
for specific purposes. See, e.g., Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 325, 202 P.2d 73 (1949).
See also 1B MOORE'SFEDERALPRACTICE
7 0.411 (11) (2d ed. 1965). Other courts have
refused to find privity between parent and child. E.g., Sayre v. Crews, 184 F.2d 723 (5th
Cir. 1950); Salay v. Ross, 155 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
39. 1 A. FREEMAN,
supra note 5, at § 438.
(SECOND)
OF TORTS4 494 (1965).
40. See RESTATEMENT
41. E.g., Bias v. Ausbury, 369 Mich. 378, 120 N.W.2d 233 (1963).
42. For cases basing preclusion on derivative rights, see, e.g., Kobmann v. Ross, 374
Mich. 678, 682, 133 N.W.2d 195, 197 (1965) ("[The husband's] action was derivative and
dependent on the right of the plaintiff wife to prevail in her suit. Her action having fallen,

620

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1977:

between parent and child; a parental suit for loss of services or
medical costs could conceivably be precluded by determination
of a previous action on behalf of the injured child. The derivative
rights concept of preclusion is presently a minority view, but is
recognized as a concept distinct from traditional privity in those
jurisdictions where it is applied.43
3. Adequate representation

Although abstract principles warranting preclusion center on
the idea of adequate representation, few courts formally recognize
a distinct doctrine of preclusion based on this concept." There
are, however, cases which warrant invocation of preclusion principles that do not fall within the traditional privity or derivative
rights classifications. The preclusion of all members of a class in
a class action suit is such a case.45Some commentators have
deemed such actions to be governed by the privity concept,46but
the class action suit is essentially based on principles of adequate
representation. Seldom would all members be found to fall within
a recognized privity classification. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the impracticality of massive joinder of
parties justify the imposition of preclusion on members of a class
who are neither parties nor privies to the initial class suit.47
The example of class actions demonstrates the fundamental
principle of adequate representation. Where claims or issues are
sufficiently litigated to render subsequent inquiry fruitless, preclusion should be imposed regardless of the precise relationship
between the persons bringing the actions. Occasionally courts
have invoked what is essentially a doctrine of adequate representation when unable to impose preclusion within the limits of trahis fell with it."); Sisemore v. Neal, 236 Ark. 574,575,367 S.W.2d 417,419 (1963). Contra,
Seymour v. Union News Co., 217 F.2d 168, 170 (7th Cir. 1954); Kraut v. Cleveland Ry.,
132 Ohio St. 125, 5 N.E.2d 324 (1936).
43. See, e.g., Kobmann v. Ross, 374 Mich. 678, 682, 133 N.W.2d 195, 197 (1965);
Sisemore v. Neal, 236 Ark. 574, 367 S.W.2d 417 (1963). But see Fischbach v. Auto Boys,
Inc., 106 N.Y .S.2d 416 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
44. But see In re Air Crash Disaster, 350 F. Supp. 757 (S.D. Ohio 1972), denied, 416
U.S.956 (1974). Neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court were willing to
sanction the district court's finding of preclusion based on adequate representation.
45. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS
§ 85(l)(e) & Comment c (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1975) (includes preclusion by class action as an example of representation by a
party).
46. Professor McCoid includes class actions along with other examples of privity by
representation. J. MCCOID,supra note 1, a t 647.
47. Cf. FED.R. CIV. P. 23 (providing for strict judicial supervision of class action
suits).
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ditional privity .48 For example, in Burns v. Unemployment Com~ court precluded litigation of a
pensation Board of R e ~ i e w , 'the
claim after a similarly situated individual had brought an action
based on identical principles. The court ruled that the second
plaintiff and all like individuals were precluded although they
were neither parties nor privies to the initial action, since all
possible issues had been adequately litigated in the first suit."
Burns is a relatively isolated example, however; no jurisdiction
has regularly applied the principle of adequate representation to
justify preclusion.
4. Application to the parent-child relationship

The prevailing view has been that the parent-child relationship does not establish privity and therefore a child cannot be
bound by a judgment against his parent under that theory. This
rule has prevailed without regard to the identity of claims or
issues or to the conclusiveness of the facts involved.51In some
instances, however, the policies favoring preclusion are clearly
served by holding that a child is bound by a judgment binding
on his parent. In many cases, particularly in personal injury litigation, these policies can be served without jeopardizing the
rights of the child. In other circumstances, the imposition of preclusion on a child after the parent has had his day in court would
work an injustice despite apparent identity of claims or issues. In
domestic relations suits, for example, where the relationship between parent and child often becomes critical, policies exist that
may render imposition of preclusion unwarranted and unjust." In
such intrafamilial disputes the parent cannot always be relied on
to adequately represent the best interests of the child.
Since some parent-child cases warrant the invocation of preclusion and others do not, it may appear that courts are justified
in adhering to the rigid principles of traditional privity. Arguably,
it is preferable to allow some unnecessary litigation rather than
48. E.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 544 P.2d 941, 126 Ca'i. Rptr. 805
(1976); Burns v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 164 Pa. Super. Ct. 470, 65 A.2d 445
(1949) (by implication).
49. 164 Pa. Super. Ct. 470, 65 A.2d 445 (1949) (per curiam).
50. Id. at 65 A.2d at 446. The court did not attempt in its per curiam opinion to
harmonize its decision with basic preclusion and privity principles.
51. See, e.g., Greenlee v. John G . Shedd Aquarium, 36 Ill. App. 3d 929, 344 N.E.2d
788 (1976).
52. See, e.g., Everett v. Everett, 57 Cal. App. 3d 65, 129 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1976) and text
accompanying notes 121-27 infra.
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possibly deprive a child of his substantive rights by improperly
invoking preclusion. I t is unnecessary, however, to err a t all since
it is possible to distinguish the situations in which preclusion is
proper from those in which it is not. Alternatively, the need for
preclusion may be circumvented entirely.53The ensuing discussion will analyze cases typical of each situation and seek to facilitate the formulation of a rational approach to both.

A.

Cases Justifying Preclusion

Provided that the facts meet the criteria for either claim or
issue preclusion54and that the parent has adequately represented
the child's interest in the first action, a court can justifiably preclude an action brought on behalf of the child after a judgment
is reached in the action brought by the parent. These requirements are generally satisfied in personal injury litigation. Since
any recovery on a minor child's claim will usually go to his parents, they have adequate opportunity and incentive to litigate
fully the issues or claims on behalf of the child, as well as any
related claims that they hold independently.
Two situations arise in personal injury litigation in which
preclusion could apply to parent-child cases. The most common
of these situations is that of a multiple injury accident. Where
parent and child are injured in a single automobile collision, for
example, each has an independent claim for relief. The issues
necessary to establish the two claims, however, are generally
identical. In such a case issue preclusion might be invoked to bar
unnecessary relitigation. A second situation in which preclusion
might be applied is that of a single injury to the child. Again two
claims arise. The child has one cause of action for any injuries
sustained, while the parent may bring suit for loss of services and
companionship or for medical expenses.
1. Personal injury-independent

claims

Preclusion often becomes an issue in cases involving multipassenger automobile accidents since each person injured may
seek to bring a separate action for damages? In a large percen53. See notes 159-74 and accompanying text infra.
54. Text accompanying notes 14 (criteria for claim preclusion) and 22 (criteria for
issue preclusion) supra.
55. See King, Collateral Estoppel and Motor Vehicle Accident Litigation in New
York, 36 FORDHAM
L. REV.1, 11-12 (1967). The author suggests that automobile accident
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tage of these cases, the passengers are family members-often
parents and children. In such cases the ultimate issues necessary
for a finding of liability or negligence are generally identical for
all passengers, yet because no privity exists in the traditional
sense courts have commonly allowed repetitive litigation until
each claimant has had his day in court.
The case of Greenlee v. John G . Shedd AquariumJ6 aptly
illustrates a court's refusal to apply preclusion where clearly justified. In 1957 an automobile carrying the Greenlee family and
driven by Edgar Greenlee collided with a truck belonging to
Shedd Aquarium. Two of the children were killed and the remaining passengers and driver suffered severe injuries." Mrs. Greenlee
brought suit against Shedd Aquarium and the employee truck
driver, alleging willful and wanton negligen~e.~~
A jury found
Greenlee to be the sole cause of the accident and absolved the
Aquarium from all negligen~e.~The
judgment was affirmed on
appeal.60
In 1970, the surviving child, Regina Lynn Greenlee, brought
an action against Shedd Aquarium, the driver of the truck, and
her father for personal injuries sustained in the accident thirteen
years earlier." Shedd Aquarium and its employee driver moved
for summary judgment on the ground that the Greenlee child was
precluded from relitigation of the same issues. The motion was
granted. The child then appealed, asserting that preclusion was
improper because she was neither party nor privy to the initial
litigati~n.'~
In 1976-almost twenty years after the accident-the
litigation is an appropriate area for expansion of the preclusion principles beyond the
traditional limits imposed by privity and mutuality. Id. a t 42-47.
56. 36 Ill. App. 3d 924, 344 N.E.2d 788 (1976).
57. Greenlee v. John G. Shedd Aquarium, 31 Ill. App. 2d 402, 405, 176 N.E.2d 684,
686 (1961).
58. Id. at 408, 176 N.E.2d a t 687. The purpose of the willful and wanton negligence
allegation was to facilitate recovery even in the event that Greenlee was found contributorily negligent.
59. Id. a t 409, 176 N.E.2d a t 688: "The bury] instructions were fair and correct.
They leave no room for doubt that . . . there was no negligence attributable to defendants
and that Edgar Greenlee's negligence, and his alone, caused the accident."
60. Id. a t 412, 176 N.E.2d a t 689.
61. Greenlee v. John G. Shedd Aquarium, 36 Ill. App. 3d 924,344 N.E.2d 788 (1976).
Shedd and the driver of the truck filed motions for summary judgment which were
granted. Consequently, plaintiffs appeal from the order did not involve the propriety of
naming her father as a defendant. Id. a t 925, 344 N.E.2d at 788-89.
62. Id. a t 925, 344 N.E.2d a t 789 (emphasis added): "Plaintiffs only contention on
appeal is that the granting of defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds
or [sic] collateral estoppel was improper." No allegations of fraud, collusion, or misconduct in the first action were made.
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Illinois Court of Appeals overruled the order granting summary
judgment and remanded the child's action for retrial on the meri t ~ Despite
. ~ ~ the probable futility of additional litigation, the
appellate court felt bound to follow the traditional privity rules
that had the effect of exempting the child from preclu~ion.~~
In the child's suit, the court could have invoked issue preclusion since all the necessary elements were presentF The issues
were identical to those in the original action and the liability
sought in both cases was based on the same facts. The issues
involved in the second suit were ultimate ones on which final
liability would be established, just as in the first case. Finally, the
issues were fully and conclusively litigated in the first action."
Not only were the elements of issue preclusion present, the
policies favoring preclusion clearly outweighed any possible danger of diluting the child's rights.67First, the court failed to give
effect to one of the fundamental policies favoring preclusion-the
final repose of decisions. For the effects of a relatively simple
automobile accident case to span almost two decades, three trial
court decisions, and two appeals seems to deny the very purpose
of the court's existence-to resolve disputes. In addition, the
court ignored the basic policy of discouraging inconsistent judgments. Allowing relitigation supposes that a viable issue still exists between the parties. While relitigation of this case is not
certain to produce inconsistent results, the possibility is not in63. Id. at 927, 344 N.E.2d at 790.
64. Id. at 926, 344 N.E.2d at 789-90 (emphasis added):
It is well established that one is not estopped or barred by a prior litigation if
he was not a party to such action and does not stand in the relation of privy to
one who was a party. . . . The concept of privity contemplates a mutual or
successive relationship to the same property rights which were the subject matter of prior adjudication.
The appellate court held itself bound by pronouncements of the Illinois Supreme Court
on the preclusion issue. Id. at 927, 344 N.E.2d a t 790, see Smith v. Bishop, 26 Ill. 2d 434,
187 N.E.2d 217 (1963).
65. See note 22 supra.
66. In the opinion in the first Greenlee appeal, the court stated:
It is argued that the verdict and judgment [against Greenlee] are against the
manifest weight of the evidence. There is no merit whatsoever in this point.

....
. . .Edgar Greenlee's

story is refuted by the overwhelming weight of the
evidence introduced on behalf of the defendants.
31 Ill. App. 2d at 405, 176 N.E.2d at 686.
67. The appeal in the second Greenlee case contained no allegations that the child
had been misrepresented or deprived of any right. The only contention was that traditional privity did not bar relitigation by the child after the parent had his day in court on
the same issues. 36 Ill. App. 3d at 925, 344 N.E.2d at 789.
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concei~able.~~
Moreover, the court's decision failed to serve the
policy of avoiding harassing litigation. Years after final resolution
of the first action, Shedd Aquarium and its employee must unnecessarily expend additional time and money defending a second action based on exactly the same issues as before. Finally, the
failure to invoke preclusion in this case resulted in unnecessary
delay and additional burden on an already overcrowded court
system. This is well attested by the six years already expended
in the second action?
On the other hand, imposition of preclusion would not have
diluted the child's rights in this case. No evidence or rationale
was presented that tended to show that the parent abridged or
compromised the child's interests in any way. On the contrary,
the evidence shows that her rights were vigorously repre~ented.'~
2. Personal injury-dependent claim

When a child is injured, the parents have the option of bringing an action on behalf of the child and in his name or bringing
the action on behalf of themselves for loss of services and expenses incurred. While the rights of the parents in such a case create
a distinct claim, that claim is, of course, dependent on the existence of the child's primary claim. It is equally clear that the
issues will be identical to both claims in such cases and that the
imposition of preclusion is warranted.
In Whitehead v. General Telephone Co., parents and child
brought independent actions for recovery based on the same accident. The Whitehead child suffered a burn while using a telephone during a storm in which the telephone line was struck by
lightning. Her parents brought an action against the telephone
company for loss of the child's services, alleging negligence by the
company's employee in repair work done on the telephone at the
whitehead residence prior to the accident. A trial on the merits
resulted in a judgment for the telephone company.72
-

--

68. See Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969).
69. Regina Lynn Greenlee brought her action in 1970. The summary judgment for
defendants was not overturned until 1976. 36 Ill. App. 3d at 924-25, 344 N.E.2d at 78889.
70. While the original Greenlee action did not include a claim for damages on behalf
of Regina Greenlee, the mother's suit did include wrongful death actions on behalf of her
two sons and personal injury claims on behalf of herself, her husband, and her surviving
son. Id. at 925, 344 N.E.2d at 789. Mrs. Greenlee was certainly provided with sufficient
motivation to exhaustively litigate the issues common to these claims and that of Regina
Greenlee.
71. 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969).
72. Id. at 109-10, 254 N.E.2d at 11-12.
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Thereafter, the father brought a second action, this time on
behalf of the minor child, for the same injuries, alleging the same
theory of negligence. In this action the Whitehead child prevailedJ3 The telephone company appealed, claiming that the
child should have been precluded by the original judgment from
bringing a second action.74The arguments on appeal dealt with
the policies underlying preclu~ion.?~
The intermediate appellate
court affirmed the lower court's ruling,76as did the Ohio Supreme
Court on further appeal." The latter court held that the single
injury gave rise to two separate causes of action,7sthat the parents' right to recover was in fact derivative of the child's primary
right,?' but that preclusion could be invoked only to bar relitigation by parties or their privies." Since, according to traditional
concepts, the child was not in privity with the parents, her cause
of action could not be precluded by their suit.
As with the Greenlee case, Whitehead contained all the necessary elements of issue p r e c l u s i ~ n Apparently,
.~~
the,court did
not impose preclusion because the parents and child did not fall
within one of the classic privity definitions. The Ohio court rejected a more liberal concept of preclusion and demanded the
traditional privity status before precluding a nonparty.
Notably, the Whitehead opinion contains dicta indicating
that in certain circumstances a child may be precluded by a
73. Id. at 111, 254 N.E.2d at 12. Major Materials Co., a co-defendant in the action,
settled and was dismissed as a party defendant. The jury then returned a verdict of
$12,500 against General Telephone Co. and judgment was entered thereon.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 113, 254 N.E.2d at 13-14: "[Alppellant argues that the present case is one
where the defense of collateral estoppel should be appropriate, and urges that the definition and use of the word privity adopted by the courts of Ohio thwarts the policies of the
doctrine of res judicata." To this the court responded: "In our opinion, the existing Ohio
requirement that there be an identity of parties or their privies is founded upon the sound
principle that all persons are entitled to their day in court. The doctrine of res judicata
. . . should not be permitted to encroach upon fundamental and imperative rights." Id.
at 116, 254 N.E.2d at 15.
76. Unreported opinion of the Lucas County Court of Appeals.
77. 20 Ohio St. 2d at 116, 254 N.E.2d at 15.
78. Id. at 112-13, 254 N.E.2d at 13. See also Weiand v. City of Akron, 13 Ohio App.
2d 73, 233 N.E.2d 880, 882 (1968) (holding that injury to daughter gave rise to two claims:
the daughter's claim for damages resulting from personal injury, and her parents' claim
for damages resulting from loss of services and for medical expenses).
79. 20 Ohio St. 2d at 115, 254 N.E.2d at 15: "In the present case, the parent's cause
of action for loss of services and medical expenses of the minor child, although derivative,
does not arise by way of succession from an estate or interest of the minor child." See
Conold v. Stem, 138 Ohio St. 352, 366, 35 N.E.2d 133, 140-41 (1941). But see notes 14446 and accompanying text infm.
80. 20 Ohio St. 2d at 114, 254 N.E.2d at 13.
81. See note 22 supra.
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judgment binding on his parent.82Such circumstances include
cases where the child is a nominal party, whether or not he actively participates in or controls the litigation; where the child is
a real party in interest;83or where the parent and child are in
actual privity under one of the traditional classifications." Lamentably, the court in Whitehead did not perceive that the desirability of precluding the second suit would not have been enhanced even had one or more of the above circumstances been
applicable .85
The Whitehead court's failure to apply preclusion served, as
in Greenlee, to undermine the basic policies supporting preclusion. The defendant telephone company was denied the protection of a reasonable assumption of finality after it had prevailed
once in a trial on the merits. Furthermore, the court's decision
underscores the absurdity of inconsistent judgments; the telephone company was found negligent and therefore liable for the
injury to the Whitehead child, but not negligent and therefore not
liable for the loss of services to her parents resulting from the
same injury. The relitigation of the same issues by nominally
different parties and the consequent increase in expense and time
to the defendant can certainly be characterized as harassing. Finally, the addition of another full trial on the merits and two
appeals placed an unwarranted burden on the court system.
Moreover, there was no contention that the Whitehead child was
inadequately represented by her parents in the initial litigation.

B. Cases Not Justifying Preclusion
In contrast to the personal injury cases discussed above,
82. 20 Ohio St. 2d at 114, 254 N.E.2d at 14: "We have also held that the term 'parties'
includes those who are directly interested in the subject matter of a suit, who have a right
to make a defense, or who control the proceedings." While this statement refers to what
is ordinarily called a real party in interest, the court went on to say in this case the child
was not a real party in interest because he did not control the litigation in any way. Id.
at 115-16, 254 N.E.2d at 15.
83. See notes 133-43 and accompanying text infra.
84. If parent and child are in a relationship of assignor and assignee, for example,
privity could be found in that context. E.g., Rafferty v. Buckler, 94 Ky. 96, 23 S.W. 947
(1893).
85. Claim preclusion could arguably be invoked in Whitehead by alleging that the
two claims arose as a result of splitting a single cause of action. Under the transactional
view of what constitutes a claim, this would undoubtedly be so. See McConnel v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 346 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1965); note 15 supra. It is notable that McConnel
was decided under a Louisiana law that is more restrictive than that of most states in
requiring identity of parties and causes of action. See LA.CN. CODEANN. art. 2286 (West
1965). See generally Blume, The Scope of a Cause of Action-Elimination of the Splitting
Trap, 38 MICH.ST. B.J., Dec. 1959, a t 10.
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domestic relations cases often involve countervailing policies that
render imposition of preclusion improper. In divorce and filiation
proceedings, the interests of parent and child may not be identical? Consequently, the parent cannot always be relied on to
represent fully the child's rights. Should the child's right be compromised by a parent in either type of action, imposition of preclusion in a subsequent action brought by the child would be
unjust. Naturally, there are cases in which the parent adequately
represents the child's interests. It is difficult, however, to distinguish between the cases in which the child's interests are sufficiently represented and those in which the child's interests are
compromised. To avoid this difficulty, most courts have adhered
to the traditional privity rules in domestic relations suits, denying
preclusive effect without an in-depth examination of whether or
not it is warranted.
To inflexibly deny preclusion in domestic relations cases
serves to insure preservation of rights, but offends the fundamental preclusion policies. Besides fostering the possibility of inconsistent judgments, postponed finality, and overburdened courts,
denial of preclusion in divorce or filiation cases allows relitigation
of potentially embarassing and harassing questions. An examination of some pertinent divorce and filiation cases reveals the nature of this conflict of policies in this area and points the way to
an effective solution to the preclusion/rights problem.
1. Divorce proceedings

Most questions concerning parent-child preclusion in divorce
proceedings center on the issue of child support." Since a parent
bringing a contested divorce action may be more concerned with
expeditious dissolution of the marriage than with the provision of
adequate child support, a conflict of interests between parent and
child may arise.
The most extreme cases of this nature are those in which
support is denied based on a finding of nonpaternity in the divorce action." Traditionally, the issue of paternity has been litigated without the participation of the child whose paternity was
in question.89If the child brings a subsequent suit for support
86. See Everett v. Everett, 57 Cal. App. 3d 65, 129 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1976).
87. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 544 P.2d 941, 126 Cal. Rptr.
805 (1976); Stewart v. Stewart, 86 Cal. 3d 108, 110, 383 P.2d 617, 619 (1963).
88. See generally Comment, R ~ Judicata
S
and Paternity, 37 U. COLO.L. REV.486
(1965).
89. But see Ohms v. Ohms, 285 App. Div. 839, 137 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1955);MICH.
COMP.
LAWS ANN. $1) 552.251-.255 (1967).
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dependent on filial status, courts are reluctant to deny him the
opportunity to litigate the issue since, according to traditional
classifications, the child is neither party to the initial action nor
in privity with his parent. Thus, the child would not be bound
by any decision on the issues.g0In such cases, the traditional
privity rules serve to protect the child.
The rights of the child, however, are not always jeopardized
by imposition of preclusion in subsequent litigation. There is
some assurance that the custodial parent of a child will adequately protect the child's financial interests, since that parent
will generally be responsible for the child's care and also be the
direct recipient of any support awarded by the court. Moreover,
in many cases the issues, including paternity, are established by
unequivocal evidence; hence, there is no justification for allowing
a second day in court.
The difficulty in distinguishing those cases in which preclusion is proper from those in which it is not is illustrated by
Gonzales v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, IwglThere, when a child
brought an action for wrongful death of his putative father, the
court admitted into evidence a judgment in a prior divorce decree
in which the child had been declared not to be the offspring of
the deceased maneg2
The child's action was accordingly dismissed.
On appeal, the case was remanded for trial because the paternity
determination was held not to be binding on the child who had
not been made a party to the original divorce proceeding."
In such a case, the propriety of preclusion is dependent upon
the conclusiveness of the facts upon which nonpaternity is established. It is perfectly clear from the Gonzales opinion that the
court was convinced that the child's rights may have been
abridged in the divorce proceeding. That possibility made application of preclusion improper." The dilemma lies in the fact that
the court could not protect the rights of the child without creating
90. See, e.g., Shatford v. Shatford, 214 Ark. 612, 217 S.W.2d 917 (1949). See also
Adamson v. Adamson, 209 Cal. App. 492, 498, 26 Cal. Rptr. 236, 241 (1962) (dictum).
Contra, Richardson v. Borders, 246 Ky. 303, 54 S.W.2d 676 (1932).
91. 34 Cal. 2d 749, 214 P.2d 809 (1950).
92. Id. at 751, 214 P.2d at 810. The decision was also based on a California statute
allowing only a spouse or a descendant of the natural or putative parent to challenge
legitimacy. See CAL.CIV.CODE# 195 (West 1954).
93. 34 Cal. 2d a t 753, 756, 214 P.2d at 811, 813.
94. The divorce was uncontested. The mother of the child alleged in that proceeding
that her husband was not the child's natural father; she asked for no support. In the
wrongful death action brought by the child, the mother repudiated her former testimony,
claiming that she had lied in the divorce proceeding to prevent the court from possibly
awarding custody of the child to her husband. 34 Cal. 2d at 753, 214 P.2d at 811.
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the possibility of inconsistent judgments.
Few courts have addressed this dilemma. In Daniels u.
Daniels,95the court attempted to rationalize the problem of inconsistent judgments on identical facts, but did so by attacking
the symptoms instead of the problem. In this case a prior divorce
decree had included a finding of nonpaternity on the part of the
natural mother's husband. In a subsequent action for support
brought by the child, the ex-husband entered into evidence the
former judgment to deny responsibility for child support. The
court held that the child was not bound by the adjudication of
nonpaternity since she was neither party nor privy to the initial
l i t i g a t i ~ n The
. ~ ~ court realized that remanding the case for trial
raised the possibility of inconsistent judgments." In order to
avoid this potential result, the court reexamined the first decision
and determined that the divorce decree did not adjudicate the
issue of paternity as to the child, but only as to the mother. In
other words, the finding of nonpaternity in the first action merely
estopped the mother from asserting that her ex-husband was the
child's father; the finding did not actually determine paternity.98
The Daniels rationale provides an inadequate remedy to the
problem of inconsistent judgments. It fails to take into account
the nature of the evidence on which nonpaternity is established
or the adequacy of representation of the child on the support
issue. No evidence of fraud or collusion was adverted to in
Daniels, yet the court felt bound to follow the traditional privity
doctrine rather than to attempt to measure the relative conclusiveness of the original finding.
A minority of courts have chosen to avoid the possibility of
inconsistent judgments on divorce issues by precluding subsequent litigation. Yarborough v. Yarboroughggrelied on a Georgia
statutelMthat specifically made a "consent (or other) decree in a
divorce suit, fixing permanent alimony for a minor child. . .binding upon [the child]. . ."lol On appeal, the United States Su95. 143 Cal. App. 2d 430, 300 P.2d 335 (1956).
96. Id., 300 P.2d at 341.
97. Id., 300 P.2d at 341: "It is true that the implied finding that Gabrielle is not the
defendant's child and the express statement in the conclusions that no determination is
made as to her paternity, present an apparent conflict which must be reconciled if possible
in aid of the judgment."
98. Id., 300 P.2d at 340.
99. 168 S.C. 46, 166 S.E. 877 (1932), reu'd, 290 U.S.202 (1933).
100. GA. CODEANN. # 30-207 (1969).
101. 290 U S . at 210. See also RESTATEMENTOF JUDGMENTS 5 85 (1942);2 A. FREEMAN,
supra note 5, at # 911.
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preme Court relied on the full faith and credit provision of the
Constitutionlozto hold the Georgia divorce decree binding on the
child in the courts of another state where the second action was
brought.lo3Significantly, the dissent made an attempt to relate
the preclusive effect of the judgment to the persuasiveness of the
merits by adverting to the question of adequate representation of
the child's interests.lo4
If preclusion were made contingent on the relative conclusiveness of the factual determinations in each case, the problem
of inconsistent judgments would be partially circumvented. In
cases where no doubt exists regarding the merits of an initial
decision, preclusion in a subsequent action cannot result in injustice. If, however, a court is unable to ascertain the validity of the
factual conclusions in a previous suit, imposition of preclusion in
a subsequent suit may infringe the rights of the second litigant.
Domestic relations suits present this dichotomy since compromise or collusion may affect some judgments while other judgments may be established with near absolute certainty. For example, in cases where nonpaternity is established through the use
of blood group exclusion tests, no doubt exists upon which to base
a protective policy of nonpreclusion.lo5
Unfortunately, such a sifting process is not procedurally feasible under present privity practices. To determine that preclusion is justified by privity and that parent and child are in privity
only when the facts are conclusive enough to warrant preclusion
creates a circular argument, not a useful rule. In addition, it is
unreasonable to expect the trial judge in a subsequent suit
brought by a child to know when collusion between spouses in the
previous divorce action may have colored the evidence. An adequate solution must provide protection of rights and insurance
against unnecessary relitigation.lo6
-

--

102. U.S. CONST.
art. N , 6 1.
103. 290 U.S. at 210, 213.
104. 290 U.S. at 214 n.1 (Stone, J., dissenting).
105. The validity of a number of blood grouping tests is now undisputed. The total
number of phenotypes existing under seventeen readily available tests exceeds 55 million.
Norway, Sweden, and Denmark have established national blood typing centers that enable their courts to prove nonpaternity in approximately 90 percent of those cases in which
a false accusation has been made. See generally H. KRAUSE,
ILLEGITIMACY: LAWAND SOCIAL
POLICY
123-37 (1971). Many spurious relitigations of paternity could be eliminated by
adopting a similar plan in the United States. Legislation has been proposed to establish
and fund a number of national blood typing stations. See S. REP. NO.93-533, 93d Cong.
1st Sess. (1973). These provisions, originally proposed in H.R. 3153, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), were omitted when the bill was enacted into law. See Act of Dec. 31, 1973, Pub.
L. No. 93-233, 87 Stat. 947 (1974).
106. See notes 159-74 and accompanying text infra.
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2. Filiation proceedings

Filiation proceedings, also known as paternity or bastardy
suits, present an even stronger conflict of policies than do divorce
proceedings.lo7The illegitimate child is often an unwanted child,
and courts are naturally skeptical of the adequacy of representation by the natural mother. There is a resulting reluctance to
apply preclusion based on such representation. Moreover, lower
courts are becoming more aware of the need to protect the interests of illegitimates as a result of changing social attitudes toward
illegitimacy108and recent Supreme Court cases securing for illegitimate~many substantive rights.lo9
At the same time, the policies favoring preclusion become
even more critical.l1° A determination of nonpaternity should provide an accused man with some assurance of finality, especially
if accomplished through the use of blood grouping tests. Inconsistency of judgments in paternity actions is less tolerable than in
personal injury litigation; a man is either the father of a child or
he is not. Irreconcilable decisions would seem to indicate that one
court had failed in its duty to provide a forum for just adjudication of disputes. Finally, unnecessary relitigation of the paternity
issue is among the most harassing actions imaginable.
The diversity of state paternity statuteslll presents a major
107. For background on the nature of filiation proceedings and the problems inherent
supra note 105.
therein, see H. KRAUSE,
108. Although the illegitimate has historically been shunned by his society, the need
for protection of illegitimates' rights was recognized early in the development of the
COMMENTARIES
*447. Despite the fact that discrimination
common law. 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
against illegitimates was considered odious and unjust, a t common law no duty of support
was immposed on the father of an illegitimate child. Such a duty is wholly statutory, with
the exception of Kansas which has found a nonstatutory duty of support. See Grayson v.
Grayson, 182 Kan. 285,320 P.2d 803 (1958). All states now provide for filiation proceedings
to establish paternity and require support in addition to providing numerous other social
and economic benefits unknown earlier in this century. IDAHO
CODE§ 7-1105 (Cum, Supp.
FAM.CODEANN. fi 13.01-06 (Vernon 1975); H. KRAUSE,
supra note 105, a t 22.
1976); TEX.
109. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. Liability Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). But see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (suggesting a
tapering off of the liberal trend established by Levy and Glona).
110. The magnitude of the problem is demonstrated by the number of potential
paternity actions that arise each year. "The case by case battle over specific statutes or
rules of common law could go on for decades without bringing meaningful results for the
mass of illegitimates who now make up some ten percent of newly born children." Krause,
The Uniform Parentage Act, 9 FAM.L.Q. 1, 9 (1975).
111. The filiation proceeding has been variously characterized. In most jurisdictions
it is civil. E.g., Gordon v. Cole, 54 Misc. 2d 967, 283 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Fam. Ct. 1967); State
v. Volz, 156 Ohio St. 60, 100 N.E.2a 203 (1951). In some it is classed as quasi-criminal;
this classification is reflected in the standard of proof required. See, e.g., WIS. STAT.ANN.
§ 52.355 (West Supp. 1969). In a few jurisdictions the action is criminal, being essentially
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obstacle to formulation of a uniform policy of preclusion in filiation proceedings. Since a majority of states regard the proceeding
as essentially civil and limited to an in personam action for support rights,l12it is appropriate to restrict the analysis for preclusion purposes to those cases.
The paramount problem in applying preclusion to filiation
proceedings concerns the party bringing the action. Authority
exists among the states for allowing the suit to be maintained by
the mother,l13 the child (by next friend-or guardian ad litem),l14
the prosecuting attorney upon the mother's complaint,l15 or a
designated state agency.l16 Most courts readily admit, however,
that the primary purpose of the action is to establish the child's
support rights?' Some courts specify that regardless of who
brings the action, the child is the real party in interest.l18This
ambiguity as to who is in fact bringing the action can cause
conflicting decisions about the preclusive effects of a former judgment on the issue of paternity.
In Stevens v. Kelley,llga California appellate court held that
a judgment with respect to a mother in a paternity suit also binds
the child. A guardian ad litem brought the case on behalf of an
illegitimate minor to establish a duty of support in the natural
father. Since a determination of nonpaternity had already been
made in an action by the mother, the court precluded the guardian's suit.120The court held that since the purpose of the first
action was to establish support for the child, he was the real party
in interest. That the child was not a nominal party in the first
action made no difference.121
a prosecution for the crime of bastardy. E.g., PA. CONS.STAT.§ 4506 (1963). See generally
Comment, Bastardy Proceeding-Civil or Criminal?, 25 TEMPLEL.Q.364 (1952).
112. See, e.g., Boyles v. Brown, 69 Mich. App. 480, 245 N.W.2d 100 (1976); Cessna
v. Montgomery, 63 Ill. 2d 71, 344 N.E.2d 447 (1976); ILL. REV.STAT.ch. 106 314, $9 54, 55
(1973); MICH.COMP.LAWS
ANN. 1)1) 722.711-.729 (1954).
113. E.g., HAW.REV.STAT.1) 579-1 (1968).
114. E.g., ARIZ.REV.STAT.# 12-621 (1956).
115. E.g., ARK. STAT.ANN. 1) 34-702 (1962).
116. E.g., COLO.REV.STAT.1) 19-5-101 (1974).
117. E.g., Kuser v. Orkis, 169 Conn. 66, 362 A.2d 943, 945-46 (1975); People v. Williams, 8 Ill. App. 3d 821, 823-24, 291 N.E.2d 323, 325 (1972); Boyles v. Brown, 69 Mich.
App. 480, 245 N.W .2d 100 (1976); In re J., 50 App. Div. 2d 890, 891, 377 N.Y .S.2d 530,
531 (1975); State v. Klinker, 85 Wash. 2d 509, 521, 537 P.2d 268, 278 (1975).
118. E.g., Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App. 2d 122, 100 P.2d 806, 811 (1940).
119. 57 Cal. App. 2d 318, 134 P.2d 56 (1943).
120. Id., 134 P.2d at 59. The holding of Stevens was not an isolated phenomenon,
devoid of practical implications. The case is cited in a California family law practice
handbook for the proposition that a minor is bound by a judgment with respect to his
FAMILYLA§ 18.8 (1961).
parent in a paternity proceeding. 1 CALIFORNIA
121. 57 Cal. App. 2d 318, 134 P.2d a t 59. See CAL.CIV.CODE4 196a (West Supp.
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Stevens exemplifies a court's willingness to find preclusion
whenever relitigation of claims or issues appears unnecessary.
The case is not consistent, however, with the mainstream of preclusion law or the policies concerning the protection of minor's
rights. The child was not in privity with the parent in the traditional sense in this case, nor is it clear that his parent represented
him adequately. The Stevens court also appears to have disregarded the relative conclusiveness of the nonpaternity finding in
reaching its decision, since it refers to the compromise of the
child's rights by the mother in the first action as an acceptable
practice.l" On this point a majority of states disagree with
Stevens, holding that a mother's release or compromise of the
child's support rights is not binding in the child's subsequent
action. 123
In the 1976 case of Everett v. E ~ e r e t t , 'another
~~
California
appellate court disparaged the Stevens holding. In the original
Everett case, the mother brought an action to adjudicate the
paternity of her illegitimate child. Oral and documentary evidence was presented to a jury. Thereafter, the mother and putative father had filed a written stipulation providing that the judge
should take the case from the jury and that the stipulation should
be considered as the mother's testimony. On the basis of that
stipulation, the putative father had prevailed and a finding of
nonpaternity had been made.125
through a guardian ad
A year later the child brought
litem, alleging that the defendant in the prior suit was in fact the
child's natural father and that the former judgment was collusive,
being the product of an agreement to pay the mother a lump sum
of money and an annuity of substantial ~ a 1 u e . lThe
~ ~ putative
father demurred, claiming that the judgment in the mother's
earlier suit precluded any subsequent litigation of the issue. The
trial court agreed and accordingly dismissed the child's
1976); CAL.CN. PROC.CODE$ 369 (West 1973).
122. 57 Cal. App. 2d 318, 134 P.2d a t 61: "There is no Code section which specifically
denies the mother of an illegitimate child authority to compromise claims of the child in
a n action for support brought by the mother on behalf of the child against the alleged
father."
123. E.g., Kamp v. Morang, 277 Ala. 575,579,173 So. 2d 566,569-70 (1964); Gammon
v. Cobb, 335 So. 2d 261, 266-67 (Fla. 1976).
124. 57 Cal. App. 3d 65, 129 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1976).
125. Id. a t 67, 129 Cal. Rptr. a t 9-10.
126. Id.
127. Id. a t 67-68, 129 Cal. ~ ~ ta tr 10.
:
128. Id. a t 68, 129 Cal. Rptr. a t 10.
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On appeal, the court in Everett resolved the problem of insuring that the minor child's rights were not diluted by holding
that he was not bound by the judgment with respect to his
mother.129The decision failed to resolve another dilemma, however. Since, under existing law, the mother retains the right to
bring the action130 but the child is not bound by any decision
rendered in her case, judicial economy suffers, as do the other
interests protected by the preclusion doctrines.
It appears that the Everett case presented an apt situation
for application of issue preclusion with one qualification-the
possibility of collusion and compromise in the mother's original
action tended to undermine the probability that the judgment in
Everett was on the merits. If the defendant were indeed the father
of the illegitimate child and the child's interests were not adequately provided for in the collusive settlement purportedly entered into by the mother, then preclusion in the Everett case
would have resulted in abridgment of the child's right to support.
Yet it is not always easy to determine if collusion occurred in a
previous suit. Preclusion in such cases would be subverted entirely if the party desiring to relitigate had merely to allege impropriety to secure a second day in court. As with the divorce cases,
the courts in filiation proceedings are faced with the question
whether they can adequately distinguish between cases warranting imposition of preclusion and those in which the policies favoring preclusion must be subordinated to other interests.

The cases discussed above clearly demonstrate that the judicial practice of rigidly refusing to apply preclusion to the parentchild relationship because of traditional privity rules works a disservice to our system of resolving disputes. Often the courts have
allowed harassing litigation and inconsistent judgments by adhering to the traditional rules. Conversely, some attempts to invoke preclusion in parent-child cases have failed to take into
129. Id. at 70-71, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 12; See CAL.CIV. CODE4 231 (West 1954). In so
holding, the court borrowed a principle from the probate code providing that a minor's
CODE§ 1431 (West
right cannot be compromised without judicial sanction. See CAL.PROB.
1956).
130. Everett was brought under CAL. CIV. CODE§ 231 (West 1954), which allows the
mother to bring the action. This statute has since been replaced by the Uniform Parentage
Act, CAL. CIV. CODE$ 4 7001-7018 (West Supp. 1976). Under the new law, the mother
retains authority to bring the action, but the problem of preclusion is obviated by the
inclusion of a mandatory joinder provision under which the child must be made a nominal
party.
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account possible parental compromise of a child's rights.13' In
some cases the application of preclusion is just and desirable.
Even when countervailing factors such as minors' rights are absent, under present practices judges have no reasonable alternative but to deny preclusion. Courts presently lack the procedural
tools to sift cases and apply preclusion only to those that factually
warrant it. Forward-lookingjurisdictions are, however, currently
testing major procedural changes in order to promote judicial
economy through application of preclusion.132The three major
devices which courts have invoked to prevent unnecessary litigation are the real party in interest rule, expanded concept of privity, and mandatory joinder.

A. Real Party in Interest Rule
Many jurisdictions have attempted to avoid the problems
that result in multiple litigation of single claims and issues by
adopting a real party in interest ru1e.l" Such a rule typically
provides that "every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest."134Because the person whose rights are
being adjudicated will be a nominal party under this rule, theoretically no compromise of the interested party's rights is possible.'%In a suit by a parent regarding the child's rights, the child
would then be made a nominal party, in which case a guardian
ad litem would be appointed to protect his interests.
The Kansas Supreme Court has held its state's real party in
131. E.g.,Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933); Stevens v. Kelley, 57 Cal.
App. 2d 318, 134 P.2d 56 (1943).
132. The Supreme Court of Nebraska has recognized the necessity for an expanded
privity concept, balanced by considerations of fairness: "In all cases in which a person
finds himself subject to preclusion generally, either (1) he has had the opportunity to
litigate the matter or (2) his interests have been adequately represented in the litigation
of the matter." Vincent v. Peter Pan Bakers, Inc., 182 Neb. 206, 207-08, 153 N.W.2d 849,
850 (1967). See id. at 211, 153 N.W. a t 851-52 (Carter, J., concurring). Likewise, the
California Supreme Court justified an expanded application of preclusion to meet the
needs of limiting litigation: "As has been said in considering the application of the doctrine [of privity], courts examine the practicalities of the situation and attempt to determine whether plaintiffs are 'sufficiently close to the original case to afford application of
the principle of preclusion."' Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 951, 544 P.2d 941,
946, 126 Cal. Rptr. 805, 810 (1976).
133. E.g.,FED.R. CN. P. 17(a); KAN.STAT.ANN. § 60-217(a) (1964). No adequate
definition of a real party in interest has been promulgated. See Kennedy, Federal Rule
17(a): Will the Real Party in Interest Please Stand?, 51 MINN.L. REV. 675 (1967).
134. FED.R. CN. P. 17(a).
135. In the case of a minor, representation is mandatory. See, e.g., CAL.Crv. PRoc.
CODE§ 372 (West 1973). This does not necessarily prevent any compromise of a child's
interest, however, since an unsympathetic parent may represent the child generally or as
guardian ad litem. But see note 170 and accompanying text infm.
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interest statute136applicable to filiation proceedings.13' In doing
so, the court noted that the purpose of the statute is to prevent
harassing multiple suits on the same claim by persons other than
nominal parties.ls8 By holding the rule applicable to filiation
suits, the court has insured that the child, indisputably the real
party in interest, is also the nominal party. Theoretically, a parent would then have no opportunity to enter into a covert agreement compromising the child's support rights. The court's opinion includes dicta indicating that a judgment for or against the
putative father in a filiation suit brought by the child as real
party in interest would be conclusive as to the child and a bar to
any others. 139
While the real party in interest rule appears to be an effective
solution in the context of filiation proceedings, the rule has not
been without criticism.140Since it is difficult in any given factual
situation to identify the real party in interest, commentators have
criticized the rule as being confusing and without function, particularly in cases where an individual is represented in litigation
by an institution such as an insurer.141Even in filiation cases the
rule conflicts with most state paternity statutes that specifically
allow persons other than the child to bring the action.ld2Criticisms of the rule reached fruition when New York abolished its
real party in interest rule in 1957 after scholars convinced the
legislature that the purposes of the rule were better served by
other devices.ld3Despite the fact that the rule has been used to
some effect in Kansas filiation proceedings, the same criticism
applies to parent-child cases; other devices better serve the needs
of both preclusion and protection of rights.

B. Extension of the Privity Concept
An obvious way to bring the parent-child relationship within
KAN.STAT.ANN. 8 60-217(a) (1964).
Lawrence v. Boyd, 207 Kan. 776, 779-80, 486 P.2d 1394, 1397 (1971).
Id. a t 779, 486 P.2d a t 1397.
Id.
E.g., Atkinson, The Real Party in Interest Rule: A Plea for Its Abolition, 32
N.Y.U.L. REV.926 (1957); Kennedy, supra note 133.
141. See Kennedy, supra note 133, a t 693-97, 701-03, 714-16.
142. Given the current status of most state laws it would be difficult to formulate a
coherent real party in interest rule that would comport with the existing paternity statutes. Indeed, the Colorado Supreme Court has ruled that the child whose paternity is in
question has no party status and may not be present in the court room, since his appearance might unduly sway a jury. See People ex rel. R.D.S., 183 Colo. 89, 514 P.2d 772
(1973).
143. N.Y. CIV.PRAC.
LAW $ 1004 (McKinney 1976).
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
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the purview of the preclusion doctrine is to expand the traditional
privity ~ 0 n c e p t .Limitations
l~~
must be placed on such expansion,
however. A blanket application of preclusion to parent-child relationships would increase the potential for inequities resulting
from compromise or collusion. Consequently, merely extending
the privity list to include parent and child is not an appropriate
solution. It should be recognized, however, that the principles of
derivative rights145and adequate repre~entation'~~
are in essence
a qualified extension of the preclusion doctrine beyond the traditional limits imposed by privity.
The derivative rights principle applies to those cases in
which a single claim"' is sought to be litigated by both parent and
child.'" Many courts consider actions by a spouse for loss of consortium or services to be derivative claims, wherein the party
claiming damages for loss of intangible rights holds such a claim
only through the injured party. If the primary right arising from
the injury fails, the derivative right must fail also, and thus is
subject to preclusion. The derivative rights principle serves
equally well in parent-child cases based on loss of services or
companionship and may apply to parental actions for medical
costs. Basing preclusion on derivative rights principles prevents
the problems of multiple litigation and inconsistent judgments
found in the Whitehead case149and in similar circumstances.
A few jurisdictions have found exigent circumstances sufficient to preclude strangers who had neither privy status nor a
derivative claim.150 Professor Allan D. Vestal notes this growing
trend to apply preclusion to nonparty-nonprivies under carefully
scrutinized situations.151Two elements which he finds to be com144. See notes 33-39 and accompanying text supra.
145. Notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra.
146. Notes 44-50 and accompanying text supra.
147. See notes 15-17, supra.
148. See Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969).
In concluding that the single injury gave rise to two distinct claims, the court apparently
resorted to a primary-right or similar definition of "claim." Under the modern transactional view, the accident in Whitehead would be held to produce a single claim, splitting
of which would invoke preclusion. See note 79 supra.
149. Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969).
150. Mass accident cases provide the clearest example of such an exigency. See In re
Air Crash Disaster, 350 I?. Supp. 757 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd sub m m . Humphreys v.
Tann, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974). In the Air Crash
case, the district court invoked adequate representation as grounds for precluding additional litigation after the initial litigant lost. The Sixth Circuit, however, was unwilling
to make this radical departure from traditional notions of privity. But see Esco Corp. v.
Tru-Rol Co., 352 F. Supp. 416 (D. Md. 1972).
151. Vestal, Res JudicatalPreclusion: Expansion, 47 S. CAL.L. REV.357 (1974).
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mon to all such situations are (1)a close relationship between the
two actions-not necessarily between the partiesls2-and (2) adequate representation of the party to be precluded.ls3While many
of the cases in which this expanded preclusion concept is applied
seem limited to narrow factual holdings, the opinions often speak
in terms of its general application.ls4
Few courts have been willing to apply an expanded preclusion concept to the parent-child relationship. In Armstrong u.
Armstrong, lss however, the California Supreme Court extended
the doctrine of adequate representation to include that relationship. In this case the children of a divorced couple sought to
relitigate financial rights determined in a prior divorce action to
which the mother was a party. While California has been a leading jurisdiction in expanding the preclusion doctrines,ls6
Armstrong is among the first cases clearly applying adequate
representation as a basis for preclusion within the parent-child
relation: ls7
152. Id. a t 373. This was one argument presented by the appellants in Whitehead.
See 20 Ohio St. 2d a t 113, 254 N.E.2d a t 13-14.
153. Vestal, supra note 151, at 373. Commentators have justified expansion of preclusion by imposing various limitations on its application. A deceptively simple argument is
that if the interests of the litigants are sufficiently identical, preclusion will not be unjust.
This limitation is insufficient since it ignores the fact that litigants may not attach the
same significance to identical interests, and compromise may infect an initial judgment.
See Note, 52 CORNELL
L.Q.724 (1967).
Other proposed limitations that might justify application of an expanded preclusion
principle are (1) the requirement of a significant relationship, (2) imposition of preclusion
only where an inconsistency in verdicts exists, and (3) application of preclusion only where
the first litigant had incentive and did in fact fully litigate all issues sought to be relitigated. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN.L. REV. 707, 714-17,
731 (1976). Unfortunately, these limitations suffer from vagueness and provide an insufficient standard with which to measure the probability of collusion or compromise.
154. Vestal, supra note 151, a t 380. See, e.g., Cauefield v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 378
F.2d 876 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009 (1967); Esco Corp. v. Tru-Rol Co., 352 F.
Supp. 416, 428 (D. Md. 1972).
A yet unresolved question is the extent to which courts may apply preclusion to
nonparties and still comply with the due process requirements of the United States ConL. REV. 33,
stitution. See Vestal, The Constitution and PreclusionlRes Judicata, 62 MICH.
47-53 (1963).
155. 15 Cal. 3d 942, 948, 544 P.2d 941, 946, 126 Cal. Rptr. 805, 810 (1976).
156. See Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122
P.2d 892 (1942).
157. 15 Cal. 3d a t 948, 544 P.2d a t 946, 126 Cal. Rptr. a t 810. Although the court
considered the nature of the relationship to be within the "privity" rubric, California has
applied the term to cases not within the traditional classification scheme. Here it was
based on adequacy of representation. See People v. Drinkhouse, 4 Cal. App. 3d 931, 93738, 84 Cal. Rptr. 773, 776-77 (1970); People v. One 1964 Chevrolet, 274 Cal. App. 2d 720,
804, 79 Cal. Rptr. 447, 453-54 (1969); notes 44-50 and accompanying text supra.
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We have previously held that privity exists where the person
involved is ". . .so identified in interest with another that he
represents the same legal right.". . . In the present case, [the
children's] mother was entrusted with their care and custody
and was a proper representative of their interests. . . . For this
reason, we conclude that [the children] are bound by the judgment in the divorce action to which their mother was a party.

The opinion leaves unresolved the question of what standard is
to be applied in measuring adequacy of representation. Such a
determination was unnecessary since in this case the complaint
contained "no specific allegations of fraud, concealment, or other
intentionally wrongful conduct." 1 5 ~
One of the major problems in determining whether a child
has been adequately represented by his parent lies in the difficulty of ascertaining if collusion or improper compromise has
infected an initial judgment or settlement, allegations notwithstanding. Consequently, preclusion based on adequate representation is an acceptable judicial tool when applied in personal
injury suits where danger of compromise is slight, but is not acceptable in domestic relations cases where this danger is very
great.

C. Mandatory Joinder
Perhaps the most viable solution to the preclusion problem
is to obviate its necessity in parent-child cases by requiring joinder of all persons having a significant interest in the 1itigation.l"
If all interested parties are required to join in the initial action,
the court may determine the rights of all without the necessity
of resorting to possibly inappropriate preclusion. Parties failing
to intervene may be precluded from further litigation by such a
mandatory intervention rule.1s0
Mandatory joinder of parties has been required at common
law,la in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,162
and in the procedural rules of many states.'" Joinder of parties with related
--

158. 15 Cal. 3d at 948, 544 P.2d at 946, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
159. For general discussion of compulsory joinder, see Reed, Compulsory Joinder of
Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH.
L. REV. 327 & 483 (1957). See also McCoid, supra note
153, at 724-28.
160. See McCoid, supra note 153, at 718-24; Comment, Nonparties and Preclusion
by Judgment: The Privity Rule Reconsidered, 56 CACIF.L. REV. 1098, 1122-32 (1968).
CODEPLEADING 348 (2d ed. 1947).
161. C. CLARK,
162. FED. R. CIV.P. 19.
ch. 110,# 23 (Smith-Hurd 1968);TEx. R. CIV.P . 39. Several
163. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT.
states have specialized compulsory joinder statutes pertaining to certain subject matter.
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claims is mandated by three policies: (1)to prevent a multiplicity
of suits on a single cause of action, (2) to eliminate the possibility
of multiple recoveries on a single claim, and (3) to rank claims
in order to facilitate pro rata distribution of any assets obtained
in the judgment? The first two reasons indicate that preclusion
and compulsory joinder share common policy bases. Thus, preclusion by its nature serves as an encouragement to joinder of
Two principal problems inherent in typical mandatory joinder provisions are not generally found in cases where parent and
child have related interests that mandate joinder. First, the provision for nonjoinder if personal or subject matter jurisdiction
would be destroyedlu is unlikely to apply to a case involving the
joinder of a minor child with his parent. Second, the provision
requiring a plaintiff to list all joinable parties,lWwhich often presents problems in identification of potential parties, is certainly
not a deterrent to joinder of a child in either personal injury or
domestic relations cases.
Joinder is a particularly suitable remedy in divorce and filiation cases because parent and child often have diverse interests
that require separate representation to insure protection of rights
and to prevent spurious litigation. The Uniform Parentage ActlBS
presents a major step toward fulfilling the purposes of preclusion
without creating the possibility of abridging the rights of the
minor child in a paternity suit. The Act requires a child whose
parentage is in question to be joined in the filiation proceeding.
Prior to promulgation and adoption of the Act, few states made
it a practice either to join the child as a party to divorce or
filiation proceedings in which paternity was contestedlBgor to
appoint a guardian ad litem. The Act provides in part:
E.g., OHIOREV.CODEANN.Civ. R. 19, 19.1 (Page 1971); PA. STAT.ANN.tit. 12, § 1625
(Purdon 1953).
L. REV. 797, 804-06 (1947).
164. Blume, Required Joinder of Claims, 45 MICH.
165. Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality, and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM.
L.
REV.1457, 1471-73 (1968).
166. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).
167. See, e.g., TEX.R. CIV. P. 39(c): "(c) Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A pleading
asserting a claim for relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons
[needed for just adjudication]. . .who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not
joined."
168. The Uniform Parentage Act has been adopted in California, Hawaii, Montana,
LAWSANNOTATED
358 (Supp. 1977).
North Dakota, and Washington. See 9 UNIFORM
169. See Ohms v. Ohms, 285 App. Div. 839,137 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1955);WIS. STAT.ANN.
§ 891.39 (West 1966).
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The child shall be made a party to the action. If he is a
minor he shall be represented by his general guardian or a
guardian ad litem appointed by the court. The child's mother
or father may not represent the child as guardian or otherwise.
The court may appoint the [appropriate state agency] as
guardian ad litem for the child. . . .170

While the Act provides that the original suit may be instigated
by virtually any interested party,"' problems regarding who is to
bring the action and who is the real party in interest no longer
affect the child since he is joined as a party and is separately
represented. Additional expense of joinder resulting from court
appointed guardians and their counsel may be minimized by
working through an existing state agency as the Act suggests.
Moreover, additional expenses incurred in a proceeding conducted under the Act would most likely be offset by recovering
child support from the fathers of children who might otherwise
be receiving state aid.
Adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act in Calif~rnial?~
moots
the precendential value of the Everett decision discussed above.173
The problems of collusive judgment, real party in interest, and
preclusion that pervaded that case cannot exist under the new
law. Joinder provisions similar to those in the Uniform Parentage
Act may be extended to other areas,by legislative action, but
unfortunately, such legislation is slow in ~ 0 m i n g . l ~ ~
IV. CONCLUSION
The policies underlying the preclusion doctrine are judicially
and socially sound. As the complexities and interdependence of
modern life create more multiple party litigation, it is incumbent
upon the courts to develop the preclusion principles to the greatest extent compatible with just results. The parent-child relationship is an appropriate area for expanded application of preclusion. It is one of the few relationships susceptible to absolute
delineation that is not within the traditional privity rubric. It is
consequently within easy judicial control and scrutiny.
In dealing with personal injury cases involving parent and
170. UNIFORM
PARENTAGE
Am 4 9.
171. See id. 4 6.
172. See CAI,. CIV. CODE$ 4 7001-7018 (West Supp. 1976).
173. Had the child been joined and represented by a court-appointed guardian, no
compromise could have occurred. As a party, the child would also be bound by the
judgment reached. See text accompanying notes 124-30 supra.
174. UNIFORM
PARENTAGE
Am 4 9; see note 163 supra.
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child, courts have available several alternatives to aid in implementing the preclusion policies. First, enforcement of existing
joinder provisions can often eliminate the need for preclusion
altogether. Second, utilization of derivative rights rules may curtail multiple litigation of single claims. Finally, application of
preclusion based on adequate representation can be applied to
parent-child cases without significant danger of diluting the
child's rights.
The chief barrier to application of preclusion to domestic
relations cases is the desire to insulate the rights of minor children from parents who may compromise or inadequately represent their interests. This problem may also be remedied within
the ambit of current procedural law. The ideal solution is mandatory joinder of children with interest in parental litigation. The
Uniform Parentage Act offers the most nearly complete remedy
to preclusion and privity problems in filiation suits.175Its adoption is desirable not only to remedy these procedural problems,
but to replace the inadequate and antiquated filiation statutes
currently in force in most states. Lacking this specialized statute,
courts may invoke existing joinder provisions to compel joinder
of children in divorce or filiation proceedings where their rights
might be litigated.
The liberal application of privity-preclusion rules to the
parent-child relationship suggested by the California Supreme
Court17(is still an acceptable solution in many cases. While this
solution is not adequate to prevent infringement of rights in all
cases, until joinder becomes a universal practice many cases will
continue to arise in which preclusion is the only device with which
a court may limit spurious, repetitive litigation.
175. Besides offering a procedural device to rectify possible preclusion problems in
filiation suits, the Uniform Parentage Act provides an integrated system whereby illegitimate children may secure other important procedural and substantive rights. Krause,
supra note 110.
176. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 544 P.2d 941, 126 Cal. Rptr. 805;
notes 159-63 and accompanying text supra.

